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Lessons from New Zealand’s COVID-19 outbreak response
In the absence of a vaccine for severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), or of highly 
effective pharmaceutical treatments for COVID-19, 
countries have implemented a large range of non-
pharmaceutical interventions to control the spread of 
the virus.1 These interventions differ in their level of 
stringency (ie, the severity of the measures) and their 
ultimate objective (eg, prevent health systems being 
overwhelmed, suppress incidence to low levels, or 
reduce incidence to zero and keep it there). With many 
countries facing epidemic resurgence, evaluating the 
impact of different strategies implemented in the early 
phases of the pandemic is crucial for developing an 
effective long-term response.
New Zealand adopted a set of non-pharmaceutical 
interventions aiming to bring COVID-19 incidence 
to zero.2 In The Lancet Public Health, Sarah Jefferies 
and colleagues3 describe the impact of New Zealand’s 
national response on the transmission of COVID-19 
using two detailed sets of data: (1) the features of 
1503 laboratory-confirmed and probable cases and (2) the 
list of all patients tested for SARS-CoV-2 in New Zealand 
between Feb 2 and May 13, 2020. The authors showed 
that many transmission chains started from younger 
imported cases, with a total of 575 imported cases 
and 459 import-related cases, and reached more 
vulnerable parts of the local population further down 
the chain (eg, residents of residential care facilities). 
Locally acquired cases were older, came from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds, and were more likely to be 
associated with severe outcomes than imported cases 
(crude odds ratio 2·32, 95% CI 1·40–3·82). The authors 
highlight that transmission chains were spread out across 
the country, with the highest incidence in popular tourist 
areas, and large transmission events such as weddings led 
to transmission chains containing multiple age groups. 
Similar dynamics have been reported elsewhere—eg, in 
Europe where young adults were infected upon visiting 
ski resorts and returned with the infection to their 
countries.4 The reconstruction of detailed epidemiological 
links is paramount to improve understanding of the 
spread of SARS-CoV-2 and keep close surveillance on 
settings with high risk of transmission.5
Identifying transmission chains before they spill over 
into vulnerable populations relies on detecting new 
importations, finding existing transmission chains 
through widespread testing and contact tracing, and 
isolating new cases and quarantining their contacts. 
Jefferies and colleagues highlight that this was achieved 
in New Zealand thanks to the rapid improvements in 
testing capacity and case management: by late April, 
the time from onset of symptoms to notification had 
been reduced from 9·7 days (95% uncertainty interval 
8·8 to 10·7) to 1·7 days (1·2 to 2·2), and the time from 
onset to isolation from 7·2 days (6·3 to 8·2) to –2·7 days 
(−4·7 to −0·8), meaning that people were isolating 
an average of 2·7 days before illness onset. Therefore, 
cases were isolated from the community promptly, 
reducing the risk of onwards local transmission. From 
mid-April onwards, higher-risk groups were targeted 
for tests by population testing surveys to avoid 
undetected circulation of the virus. Nevertheless, the 
authors report only 25 asymptomatic infections in the 
dataset, which corresponds to 1·7% of all cases. This is 
much lower than the commonly reported proportion 
of asymptomatic infections in COVID-19 outbreaks, 
which varies between 20% and 40%.6 This finding 
suggests that many asymptomatic individuals remained 
undetected despite targeted testing of groups less likely 
to show symptoms in the late phases of New Zealand’s 
epidemic. Comparing setting-specific serosurveys and 
surveillance data could reveal the profile of infections 
that New Zealand’s surveillance system struggled to 
identify, thus highlighting an area for improvement in 
the infection detection process. This could also indicate 
whether the detection of asymptomatic infections 
should be a priority, as recent genomic epidemiology 
studies suggest many introductions did not result in 
transmission chains,7 which might be linked to a lower 
infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals.
The lockdown implemented in New Zealand was re-
markable for its stringency and its brevity: Jefferies and 
colleagues show that the daily number of cases dropped 
below ten in mid-April, less than a month after the first 
increase in New Zealand’s Alert Level.8 Furthermore, 
although most of the cases reported by mid-March were 
imported, almost no further importation was observed 
2 weeks after the implementation of the first travel 
bans and isolation orders: imported cases represented 
58% (95% CI 53–62) of the cases before March 15 but 
Comment
2 www.thelancet.com/public-health   Published online October 13, 2020   https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(20)30237-1
just 38% (36–41) of the total. Control of importations 
and local transmission in New Zealand was achieved 
with stringent non-pharmaceutical interventions 
imple mented rapidly when infection numbers were 
low: the Alert Level escalated from 1 to 4 in 5 days, 
when the number of cases had just passed 1000. Such 
stringent measures do not always result in a rapid drop 
of cases: the lockdown implemented in Melbourne 
on Aug 5, 2020, shows that it can take months before 
incidence is brought to minimal levels, with measures 
kept in place until late September. Long-lasting 
lockdowns also cause major economic disruption, 
deterioration of mental health in the population,9 
and other indirect health consequences,10 ultimately 
decreasing population compliance. As other high-in-
come countries have reported an increasing number 
of cases since August, 2020, the experience of 
New Zealand highlights that successful non-pharma-
ceutical interventions rely on early decisive reactions 
from health authorities, performant survei llance 
systems, and targeted testing strategies as much as 
stringency.
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